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In The 
SUPREME COURT 
Of The 
STATE OP UTAH 
DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN RUSSELL, 
his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
STERLING B. MARTELL d/b/a MARTELL 
HOLDING COMPANY, et al, and 
GRANT.C. MILLS, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Supreme Court 
No. 18160 
While the merits of this action involve the collection 
of a promissory note, the foreclosure of an equitable lien and 
allegations of securities law violations against numerous 
parties, this appeal concerns only a motion to set aside a 
default judgment against the appellant, Grant C. Mills. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower·court denied the motion to set aside the 
default judgment without stating the grounds therefor. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mills seeks to have the lower court's denial of the 
motion reversed and to have the default judgment set aside so 
that the case can be considered on its merits. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Grant C. Mills, (hereinafter "Mills") 
was served with a summons and complaint in this action on July 
7,. 1981. He immediately contacted Ronald Stanger, the attorney 
who had previously represented Mr. Mills and other defendants 
named in this action, and was instructed by him to forward the 
summons and complaint to him for response. He assumed that 
having the same attorney represent all defendants would save 
expense. Mills heard nothing further from Stanger and he 
assumed an answer or other appropriate pleading had been filed 
on his behalf. Mills also contacted David Russell, one of the 
plaintiffs, (hereinafter "Russell") who informed Mills that he 
was not after him but only wanted a judgment against the other 
defendants. Mr. Stanger failed ·to file an answer to the 
complaint for Mills although-he did file answers for other 
defendants (R.20). Because of this failure, a judgment by 
default was entered against Mills on July 29, 1981 (R. 39), 
just 22 days after the service of summons. 
Later Mills, through his employee, inquired of the 
Salt Lake County Clerk to determine if any judgment had been 
entered against him. His employee was informed that no 
judgment had been entered against him but that a judgment had 
been entered against two other defendants (R. 57,60). He, 
therefore, assumed Mr. Stanger had answered the complaint on 
his behalf. On November 24, 1981, Mills received in the mail a 
copy of a Writ of Execution issued against his property to 
collect the judgment entered against him. This was the first 
-2-
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notice he had of the fact that a judgment had been taken 
against him. He then contacted the Salt Lake County Clerk and 
was again informe? that no judgment had been entered against 
him. He immediately contacted a new attorney who, upon 
investigation, learned of the judgment entered on July 29, 
1981. It later became apparent that the employee in the 
clerk's office had located the judgment against other 
defendants (R.50) but had overlooked the separate judgment 
against Mills (R.39). 
Mills' new attorney prepared the necessary documents 
and filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on December 4, 
1981 (R.53). The motion was supported by affidavits of Mills 
(R.56), his employee (R.60) and his former attorney, Ronald 
Stanger, (R.62), and by a proposed Answer to the Complaint 
(R.66). Mr. Stanger confirmed that he represented Mills on 
other matters, including a related case involving the 
plaintiff's brother (R. 64), that Mills had contacted him about 
representation in this action and had sent the summons and 
complaint to him and that he failed to file an answer for Mills 
due to some confusion in his office (R.62-3). 
The motion was heard by the lower court on December 
10, 1981 and denied without specification of the reasons 
therefor (R.72). A formal order denying the motion was never 
entered but this appeal was taken and a supersedeas bond filed 
on December 14, 1981 in order to stay the execution sale of 
Mills' property scheduled for December 15, 1981 (R.74). 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
In arriving at a decision as to whether or not to 
relieve a party from a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must balance the need 
for finality of judgments against the need to resolve 
controversies on their merits after a presentation of all the 
evidence. The standards for this balancing process have been 
stated, on the one side, as whether granting relief would 
result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the judgment 
creditor, Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul w. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P. 2d 876, 879 (Utah, 1975), or in 
"hardship for the successful litigant by causing him to 
' 
prosecute more than once his action and subjecting him to the 
possible loss of collecting his judgment" and, on the other 
side, the desire "to protect the losing party who has not had 
the opportunity to present his claim or defense" who "must show 
that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 U. 2d 65, 513 P. 2d 
429, 431 (1973); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 
P. 2d 741, 743 (1953). And while the lower court has 
discretion in applying these standards, Pacer Sport and Cycle, 
Inc. v. Myers, 534 P. 2d 616, 617 (Utah, 1975), that 
"discretion must be exercised in furtherance of justice and the 
-4-
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court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to 
the end that the party may have a hearing." Warren, supra, ~t 
743. See also Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA Development 
Corporation, 611 P. 2d 369, 371 (Utah, 1980). This court has 
further stated, in Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 14 U. 
2d 52, 376 P. 2d 951, 952 (1963): 
[T]he court cannot act arbitrarily in that 
regard, but should be generally indulgent 
toward permitting full inquiry and 
knowledge of disputes so they can be 
settled advisedly and in conformity with 
law and justice. To clamp a judgment 
rigidly and irrevocably on a party without 
a hearing is obviously a harsh and 
oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our 
system of justice that each party to a 
controversy should be afforded an 
opportunity to present his side of the 
case. For that reason it is quite uniformly 
regarded as an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
there is reasonable justification or excuse 
for the defendant's failure to appear, and 
timely application is made to set it aside. 
See also Central Finance Co. v. Kynaston, 22 U. 2d 284, 452 P. 
2d 316, 318 (1969). 
Based on these standards, the questions to be 
determined on this appeal are (1) would an order setting aside 
the default judgment in this case result in substantial 
prejudice,· injustice or hardship for Russells; (2) was there 
reasonable justification for Mills' failure to answer; and (3) 
did he use due diligence and make timely application to have 
the judgment set aside. The court must then balance the 
answers to these questions to arrive at a result which is fair 
and just to both parties. 
-5-
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1. Would an order setting aside the default judgm~nt 
in this case result in substantial prejudice, 
injustice or hardship for Russells? 
While setting aside the judgment would prejudice 
Russells in the sense that they could not enforce a judgment 
which now exists in their favor, that does not necessarily 
result in injustice or hardship to them. It has yet to be 
determined whether a judgment in their favor is just since no 
evidence has been presented from which that determination can 
be made. In fact, a hearing on the merits may show that 
Russells are not entitled to any judgment at all and that no 
injustice results from setting aside the default judgment. 
Furthermore, judgment was entered in this case only against 
Mills and further proceedings are necessary to resolve the 
matter as against other defendants. Therefore, to set aside 
the judgment against Mills and all~w the case to go to trial 
aganst him and the other defendants at the same time does not 
prejudice or result in any hardship for Russells. And, because 
of cross-claims existing among the defendants, judicial economy 
also argues for one proceeding to resolve all issues. 
2. Was there reasonable justification for Mills' 
failure to answer? 
One might ask what more Mills should have done to 
properly defend himself in this action. After being served 
with process, he immediately contacted the attorney who had 
represented him and other defendants previously. He was told 
-6-
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to forward the summons and complaint to the attorney, which he 
did, by mail, since the attorney was located in Provo. Mills 
then depended on the attorney to handle the matter for him. The 
attorney failed to do so although he did file a response for 
Mills in a related case filed about the same time (R.64, ~ 14). 
Mills himself did inquire of the County Clerk as to whether a 
judgment had been entered against him and was twice informed 
that it had not. Mills could justifiably assume that his 
attorney had filed an answer for him. There would be no reason 
for him to take any further action until notified by his 
attorney. The attorney verified that his failure to answer for 
Mills was the result of confusion in his office because of the 
existence of other cases involving the same or related parties 
and, incidentally, the same attorneys on both sides. Why 
Russells' attorneys would enter default judgment against Mills 
and issue an execution thereon in one case when they had an 
answer in hand from Mills in the related case, is somewhat 
puzzling. In any event Mills acted reasonably under the 
circumstances and should not be deprived of an opportunity to 
presen~ his case by circumstances beyond his control. 
Rule 60(b) lists the grounds upon which relief from a 
judgment may be granted. The circumstances of this case 
obviously do not fall within subparagraphs (2), (3), (4) or (6) 
of that rule and, while it is less obvious, they do not fall 
within subparagraph (1) either. Mills' actions do not 
constitute mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Rather, 
he did everything reasonably expected of him and perhaps more. 
-7-
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But despite his diligence, he has not had an opportunity to 
present his case, through no fault of his own. That certainly 
constitutes "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment," within subparagraph (7) of Rule 
60(b). 
3. Did he use due diligence and make timely 
application to have the judgment set aside? 
When Mills learned of the judgment against him, he 
took immediate action to have the judgment set aside. He 
received the writ of execution on November 24, 1981 and 
retained a new attorney who filed the motion to set the 
judgment aside on December 4, 1981. Thus, within ten days, the 
motion, three affidavits and a proposed answer to the complaint 
were prepared and filed. That certainly constitutes due 
diligence. 
The question of timely application for relief 
requires an interpretation of Rule 60(b). The rule states that 
a motion under this rule should be brought within three months 
after the judgment if the motion is based on the first four 
subparagraphs but within a reasonable time after the judgment 
if based on the latter three subparagraphs. The three-month 
limitation on the first four grounds is obviously based on the 
assumption that the party against whom the judment is entered 
has knowledge that a judgment has been entered. If he has such 
knowledge and fails to take any action within three months, the 
rule assumes he has no grounds to have the judgment set aside 
-8-
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or that he has knowingly waived such grounds. However, if he 
has no such knowledge within the three-month period, it is 
impossible for him to take any action to obtain relief from the 
judgment within that period and it cannot be said that he has 
knowingly waived his rights. Therefore, reason suggests that 
the three-month limitation would not begin to run until the 
judgment debtor has notice of the entry of the judgment or that 
the last ground stated ("any other reason justifying relief") 
was intended to cover such situations. Otherwise, it would be 
possible for a plaintiff to cause a judgment to be entered 
against a defendant who does not answer because of fraud, 
misrepresentation, misconduct, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
excusable neglect or improper service (all grounds for relief 
from the judgment if asserted within three months) and 
intentionally fail to notify the defendant of the entry of the 
judgment until three months had expired, thereby depriving the 
defendant of his rights under the rule. It is interesting that 
in this case, Russell's took no action to enforce the judgment, 
which was entered July 29, 1981, until November 24, 1981, after 
the three months had expired. It is not claimed that such 
delay was intended to deprive Mills of his rights under Rule 
60(b)(l)-(4). But, whether intentional or not, the effect is 
the same, unless the three-month period runs only from the time 
of notice to the judgment debtor or unless Rule 60(b)(7), the 
"any other reason" ground, covers this situation. This 
interpretation is required to prevent the fraud or injustice 
which Rule 60(b) is designed to prevent. Mills application for 
-9-
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~elief from the judgment within ten days after notice to him of 
the entry of the judgment and within five months of the entry 
of the judgment itself was more than reasonable and, therefore, 
timely within the requirements of the rule. 
It is interesting to note that of four Utah cases in 
which the motion for relief from a judgment was made after the 
three months expired and based on Rule 60(b)(7), one case 
denied the relief because the real ground upon which relief was 
sought was the judgment creditor's own inadvertence, ·and, 
therefore, Rule 60(b)(l) applied, Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P. 2d 
171 (Utah, 1977), (the plaintiff sought to set aside his own 
judgment seven months after judgment and the defendant opposed 
the motion), one case denied relief because the asserted 
ground was misrepresentation under Rule 60(b)(3), Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 546 P. 2d 888 (Utah, 1976), (mo.tion brought six 
months after judgment), but the other two cases granted the 
relief under Rule 60(b)(7) even though the real ground upon 
which relief was sought was mistake to which Rule 60(b)(l) 
applies, Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 U. 2d 156, 506 P. 2d 74 (1973) 
(motion brought 13 months after judgment); Ney v. Harrison, 
5 U. 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114 (1965), (motion brought 11 months 
after judgment). This indicates an inclination to grant relief 
for grounds within subparagraphs (1) through (4) even though the 
motion is brought after three months if the moving party can 
show reasonable excuse. 
This court has also stated in dictum that Rule 
60(b)(7) is available to afford relief in cases of lack of due 
process arising from lack of notice of a hearing at which an 
-10-
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adverse judgment was rendered. Bish's Street Metal Co. v. 
Luras, 11 U. 2d 357, 359 P. 2d 21, 22 (1961). The court later 
did afford relief from judgments rendered at hearings of which 
the losing party had no notice. Central Finance Co. v. 
Kynaston, 22 U. 2d 284, 452 P. 2d 316 (1969); Interstate 
Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 611 P. 2d 369 
(Utah, 1980). The motions in these cases were brought within 
three months from the judgment but lack of notice was the basis 
for the decisions, thus coming within the dictum of Bish that 
lack of due process is "any other reason" within Rule 60(b)(7). 
In both cases the losing party acted immediately to have the 
judgment set aside. 
In the same spirit, Mills, in this case, was deprived 
of his right to bring· a motion within three months by lack of 
notice to him that a judgment had been entered. There was no 
way he could act sooner than he did. This lack of notice to 
him and his due diligence in making immediate application to 
the court should constitute "any other reason" within Rule 
60(b)(7). Because he has not had an opportunity to present his 
case and no substantial injustice or hardship would result to 
Russells, the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to 
set aside the default judgment. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE IS VOID SINCE 
NOT BASED UPON PROPER EVIDENCE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH RULE 55(b)(2). IN ANY EVENT THE JUDGMENT 
IS OBVIOUSLY FOR THE WRONG AMOUNT, WHICH IS 
A REASON JUSTIFYING RELIEF THEREFROM. 
-11-
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Rule 55(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that judgment by default may be entered by the clerk when the 
claim is for "a sum certain". Otherwise, the judgment by 
default must be entered by the court upon application thereto 
and "if, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of an 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such 
references as it deems necessary and proper." 
This action is basically an action to collect a 
promissory note signed by other defendants and not by Mills. 
The claims against Mills are based on allegations that he acted 
as a securities agent without being registered as such (R.6) 
and that he made untrue representations to Russells by means of 
a written pledge (R.6-7,13), which was not signed by Mills, in 
violation of the securities laws (§61-1-1, U.C.A.), thereby 
causing damage to Russells. Such claims are not for sums 
certain and could not be established without taking evidence to 
establish both the truth of those averments and the amount of 
damages resulting therefrom. This would require the 
presentation of evidence, under §§61-1-1, and 66-1-22, U.C.A., 
as to: 
(1-) Whether Mills was in fact a licensed securities 
agent; 
(2) Whether the note constituted a security 
requiring registration; 
-12-
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(3) Whether there existed any exception from such 
registration, for example, as an isolated 
transaction [§61-l-14(2)(a)] or as secured 
indebtedness [§61-l-14(2)(e)]; 
(4) Whether any representations were made to 
Russells by Mills; 
(5) Whether those representations were true or 
false; 
(6) Whether Russells knew of the untruth of the 
representations; 
(7) Whether Mills knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care could have known, of the untruth 
of the representations; 
(8) What amount was paid by Russells for the note; 
(9) What amount of income Russells received on the 
note; 
(10) What damages were caused as a result of the 
alleged violations; 
(11) What amount of attorney's fees were incuTred by 
Russells and whether they are reasonable. 
Surprisingly, however, no evidence on any of these 
issues was presented to the court. The default judgment was 
merely signed by the lower court upon presentation by Russells' 
attorney without hearing any evidence or making any findings of 
any kind (R.39). Russells' complaint does not contain 
allegations with respect to items (3), (6), (7), (8), (9) and 
(11) above and, therefore, even if all allegations of the 
complaint were taken to be true, they have not established a 
prima facia case. A judgment based on a complaint which does 
not state a claim on its face and a judgment which, on its 
face, was not based on evidence, as required by Rule 55(b)', is 
void. Even if evidence had been taken, it must support the 
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judgment or the judgment should be set aside. Pitts v. Pine 
Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589 P. 2d 767 (Utah, 1978); see also 
Security Adjustment Bureau v. West, 20 U. 2d 292, 437 P. 2d 214 
( 1968) . 
Since the claims against Mills allege violations of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act, any judgment against him must 
be based on §61-l-22(l)(b), U.C.A., which provides for recovery 
of "the consideration paid for the security, together with 
interest at 8% per year from the date of payment, costs, and 
reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of any income 
received on the security." 
An examination of the promissory note (R.11), which 
is the basis of Russells' entire claim, will disclose the lack 
. 
of support for the judgment entered. The note shows that the 
amount paid for the note was apparently $48,000.00. No 
maturity date appears in the note yet the amount to be repaid 
includes the principal and interest at 30% per annum for six 
months. Russells actually received 14 monthly interest 
payments on the note or a total of $16,800.00 (R.58). Thus, if 
evidence had been taken by the court and a violation by Mills 
of the securities laws established·, the judgment should have 
been entered for "the consideration paid ·for the security" of 
$48,000.00, "together with 8% per year from the date of 
payment," that is from October l, 1979 to July 29, 1981, of 
$7,006.68, "less the amount of any income received on the 
security" of $16,800.00, or a total of $38,206.68. Instead, 
judgment was entered for $63,266.00 plus $5,000.00 attorney's 
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fees. Therefore, the amount of the judgment is obviously in 
error even if the alleged violations are taken to be true. The 
injustice of this situation becomes more apparent when it is 
considered that the Russells' attorney was made aware of this 
error and admitted that it was an error but refused to make any 
correction in the judgment! (R.58). Certainly the law and the 
rules of procedure provide the means to relieve Mills from such 
injustice. Rule 55(b) was designed to prevent such injustice 
and the failure of the Russells or the lower court to follow 
Rule 55(b) should be corrected on this appeal. There are 
clearly "other reasons" justifying relief from the default 
judgment, within Rule 60(b)(7), and the refusal to grant such 
relief was an abuse of discretion by the lower court. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case Mills acted reasonably under the 
circumstances. He entrusted the response to the complaint to 
his attorney. He had no knowledge of a judgment against him 
until four months after the entry of that judgment. Upon 
learning of the judgment, he took action immediately to have it 
set aside. No substantial hardship or injustice would have 
resulted to Russells if the lower court had vacated the 
judgment. Mills has valid defenses to the claims against him. 
Under these conditions, it was an abuse of the lower court's 
discretion to refuse to set aside the judgment and allow those 
claims to be determined on their merits after full opportunity 
to present evidence on both sides. 
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The default judgment in this case was entered without 
the presentation of any evidence as to the truth of Russells' 
allegations or as to the amount of damages. It is apparent 
from the record that judgment was entered for nearly twice the 
amount to which Russells would be entitled even if the alleged 
volations were proved. The lower court committed error when it 
entered judgment without hearing any evidence to support it and 
it committed error again when it refused to set aside that 
judgment. 
Under such circumstances, Mills is entitled to an 
opportunity to present his defenses and his evidence and to 
have the case against him decided on its merits. The default 
judgment against him should, therefore, be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
By~~~ 
~arsh 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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